

**Roots of a Dilemma: SBC Entities and the Cooperative Program**

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Since 1975 I have been a direct beneficiary of the Cooperative Program (CP) of the Southern Baptist Convention as either a student or employee of the New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary. This prompted a lifelong interest in both the Cooperative Program and its effects on SBC entities. In 1996 I became President of New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary and had to deal quite directly with CP. Twice in my presidency significant changes were made in the Cooperative Program, and I had to handle the effect of those changes on the Seminary. One change was a reallocation of the existing distribution formula for SBC entities as a result of the Covenant for a New Century. The other change was a decision to eliminate the capital needs component of the SBC budget. For several years I felt there was a missing piece in Cooperative Program discussions without knowing what that piece was. For me the light has dawned and the missing piece is at hand. Once stated it seems quite obvious, but I have not heard it expressed before in CP discussions.

The missing piece is an understanding that the twelve SBC entities operate on different economic models, and as a result changes in the Cooperative Program affect the different entities in significantly different ways. It is a given that there will never be enough CP to fund all the needs and ministries of the SBC entities. This is particularly true in light of CP income not growing as fast as the inflation rate, which has been true for at least the last three decades. As

the SBC faces choices about the allocation of limited resources, understanding accurately the different ways the entities are affected by the Cooperative Program is essential to making the inevitable tough funding decisions.

This white paper is an attempt to put that missing piece on the table for discussion. It is a model that helped me understand not only my own entity and its needs, but to gain at least some understanding of the other entities as well. The model is not a recommendation on how to handle Cooperative Program funds. Rather, the model is offered as a possible framework for discussions on those tough funding decisions. After the model is explained and illustrated, my perspective on the funding study now underway is included, in part to show how the model can be used in such discussions, and in part because the acute needs of my faculty, staff, and students compel me to offer some alternatives for consideration. The paper is done in broad strokes. Every detail of CP is not addressed. Only the distribution of the SBC portion of the Cooperative Program is discussed. Every issue is not explored in order to keep the focus on a big picture and to limit the length of the paper. It should be noted that this white paper was not assigned to me. My private musings led me to do it for myself. Once done, I thought it might serve as a launching point for the thinking of others. The Southern Baptist Convention is facing a dilemma not widely recognized or discussed. Ultimately this paper is about that dilemma, its significance, and some possible solutions.

### The Model

In economic terms there are three kinds of entities in Southern Baptist life: Cooperative Program Funded entities, Cooperative Program Supported entities, and Cooperative Program Sustaining entities. Put another way, through the years Southern Baptists have chosen to fund the ministries of their entities at three different levels: total support, partial support, and indirect

support. This created three different economic relationships to the Cooperative Program among the current 12 entities.

#### Cooperative Program Funded Entities

CP Funded entities are able to fulfill the ministry assigned to them solely through the allotment of CP funds they receive each year. The Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission and the Executive Committee are Cooperative Program Funded entities. Nearly all of their operating budgets come from the Cooperative Program. Each has other income, but they could do what Southern Baptists expect them to do if all they had for income was the Cooperative Program. They are in effect fully funded by CP.

#### Cooperative Program Supported Entities

CP Supported entities receive a significant portion of their budgets from the Cooperative Program, but they could not function adequately and fulfill the expectations of Southern Baptists without significant additional sources of income. The two mission boards and the six seminaries are Cooperative Program Supported entities. If their operating budgets were drawn only from their annual allotment of the Cooperative Program, these entities would be crippled and unable to make substantive progress toward fulfilling their assigned ministries. For example, at New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, the annual Cooperative Program allocation is not enough to cover personnel costs alone. All other operating costs of the Seminary are completely unfunded by CP. This is a little known fact. Cooperative Program Supported entities could not function without the Cooperative Program, but neither could they function on their Cooperative Program income alone. They are partially funded by CP.

#### Cooperative Program Sustaining Entities

CP Sustaining entities receive no money from the Cooperative Program for their operating budgets. They are able to fulfill their assigned ministries without the benefit of Cooperative Program funds. The Annuity Board and LifeWay Christian Resources are CP Sustaining entities. Their operating budgets come from the direct services they perform for Southern Baptists. They are big promoters of the Cooperative Program. They benefit indirectly from CP through the denominational identity it helps to create, forming the base of the people and churches these entities serve. Their direct services and their CP promotion are important parts of the glue that keeps Southern Baptists together. They play a sustaining role in promoting the CP, but they have no direct benefits from its funds.

To summarize the model: Among the twelve SBC entities, there are three different relationships to the Cooperative Program. Two entities are in effect fully funded by the Cooperative Program. They are the Executive Committee and the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission. These are Cooperative Program Funded entities. Eight entities are partially funded by the Cooperative Program. Those eight are the International Mission Board, the North American Mission Board, Golden Gate Theological Seminary, Midwestern Theological Seminary, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, and Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. These are Cooperative Program Supported entities. Two entities benefit only indirectly from the Cooperative Program. They are the Annuity Board and LifeWay Christian Resources. These are Cooperative Program Sustaining entities. See Appendix A for a numerical portrait of the model.

#### Implications of the Model

Through the years Southern Baptists recognized that the Cooperative Program could not

keep up with the ministry needs of all its entities. It was impossible for every entity to be a Cooperative Program Funded entity. Alternative funding strategies were developed for those entities that could not be fully funded.

To supplement their CP income, the six seminaries were allowed to do limited fund-raising in accordance with the SBC business and financial plan, and they were allowed to request funds from the Cooperative Program, above their normal allocation, for capital projects. Traditionally the capital projects funded were those most difficult to raise money to do, such as the repair and maintenance of campus infrastructure, the repair and renovation of old buildings already named for past donors, and so forth. The capital needs funding for the seminaries did not have much impact on the annual operating budgets of the seminaries, but it did provide critical help for some of their most complex needs.

The only other source of funding for the seminaries was the fees charged to students. Every effort was made to keep these fees as low as possible to make theological education affordable for any Southern Baptist called into the ministry. This was a very significant issue because of the denomination's need for leaders in small and medium sized churches, for leaders to start new churches, and for missionary volunteers. For students to be in a position to serve a small church, to start a new church, or to go to the mission field, they need to have a minimum of debt upon the completion of their training. The accumulation of debt in the process of education always has the effect of limiting future options for ministry until the debt is serviced. This price control was done successfully, and Southern Baptists were quite well known in the 20<sup>th</sup> century for theological education costing much less than national averages. However, this model set in motion pressures for Southern Baptist churches to provide less and less of the operating budgets of the six seminaries over time. The CP allocation came from SBC churches, but fees and gifts

came primarily from students and individual donors.

Together the two mission boards receive more than seventy percent of the Cooperative Program budget. That is quite a bit of money, but still not enough for them to fulfill their ministry assignments. An annual offering, endorsed by the denomination and received at the local church level, was approved to supplement funding for the two mission boards. These offerings dramatically enhanced their operating budgets and made them much more able to do their ministries and fulfill the expectations of Southern Baptists. Each mission board now receives more money from their annual offerings than they do from their annual CP allocation. As a pleasant side effect the offerings proved to be an excellent educational tool, keeping Southern Baptists informed and up to date on the missions ministries of the denomination each year. The offerings also annually reinforced the denominational identity in participating churches. Perhaps most importantly the offerings plus the Cooperative Program allocation combined to keep Southern Baptist churches as the source for most of the operating budgets of the mission boards. In addition to their large annual offerings, the mission boards were eventually allowed to do limited fund-raising in accordance with the business and financial plan and to participate in the capital needs program.

Although the Annuity Board and LifeWay Christian Resources received virtually no CP support, they were still funded by a strategy tying them closely to Southern Baptist churches. The Annuity Board was charged with providing insurance and retirement services for Southern Baptist ministers. LifeWay was charged with producing Sunday School literature and other resources and books for Southern Baptist churches. As a result, Southern Baptist churches, their members and ministers, were the major customers for the services provided for these two entities. Their operating budgets did not come from CP, but to a large extent they did come from

Southern Baptist churches. Thus it was in the best interest of both the Annuity Board and LifeWay to promote CP and all things that would strengthen Southern Baptist identity. The funding strategy for these CP Sustaining entities served to reinforce their ties to the SBC and its churches.

It appears, then, that in the case of all entities but the six seminaries, economic ties were put in place that would make Southern Baptist churches the major source for operating budget funds. In the case of the Executive Committee and the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, most of their operating budgets came from the Cooperative Program. In the case of the mission boards, CP plus the annual offerings from SBC churches provided most of their operating budgets. For LifeWay and the Annuity Board, income for goods and services provided directly to Southern Baptist churches provided a large portion of their incomes. The six seminaries, however, were not allowed to go directly to SBC churches for supplemental income. They received a CP allocation and could charge fees to students and do limited fund-raising with individuals. Their only other source of supplemental income was the capital needs budget of the SBC.

To summarize: given these three economic models, the SBC developed strategies to supplement the budgets of entities it could not fully fund. The question Southern Baptists would therefore have to face from time to time is whether or not the alternative strategies in place for supplementing the operating budgets of the CP Supported entities are still providing an adequate amount of funds for the entities to fulfill their ministry assignments. A less obvious but more

significant question was whether or not the alternative funding strategies would continue to strengthen or weaken the ties binding the entities to the SBC and its churches.

#### Effects of Change On SBC Entities

Because they are based on different economic models, changes in CP affected the SBC entities differently. More than five years ago Southern Baptists started a process to increase the amount of Cooperative Program funds available for CP Funded entities and CP Supported entities. The Covenant For A New Century was designed to reorganize the SBC and make it more efficient so that less money would be spent on administrative overhead and more of the Cooperative Program would be directly involved in the ministries of SBC entities. A number of entities were eliminated, and a number of programs reassigned. The result was a savings of millions that has enhanced the ministries of the remaining agencies. When measured against inflation, however, the amount of money given to the Cooperative Program has remained flat, while operating expenses have regularly increased. The greatest general effect of the Covenant for a New Century was an increased efficiency that to some extent offset the inroads of inflation on CP income. All SBC entities benefited from this aspect of the change.

Also, in light of the restructuring, the distribution formula for the Cooperative Program was changed. The Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, a Cooperative Program Funded entity, was given an additional half percent. This in effect funded an assignment given to the ERLC in 1991. The SBC asked the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission to represent Southern Baptists in Washington, but provided little new operating money for doing so. The new money made it much easier for the ERLC to fulfill this newer assignment and other new initiatives. The other Cooperative Program funded entity, the Executive Committee, was also given a significant percentage increase in the allocation formula. It went from receiving 2.27

percent of the budget to receiving 3.32 percent, an increase of 1.05 percent. This was the second largest change for any one entity, dramatically improving the Executive Committee budget and making new initiatives possible. The largest change went to the newly formed North American Mission Board. This was to fund the additional ministries absorbed when the Home Mission Board was combined with the Radio TV Commission and the Brotherhood Commission. The six seminaries were given an additional one percent to divide among themselves in accordance with the SBC seminary funding formula. The added funding did not make new initiatives possible for the seminaries, but it did provide some important assistance. For all but one of the seminaries the annual CP allocation from SBC churches was still not enough to cover the payroll. (see Appendix C).

The Cooperative Program Funded entities were the biggest beneficiaries of the change in the funding formula, particularly the Executive Committee. All entities benefited from the cost reduction that followed the closing of several entities and reassignment of various programs. The percentage of money spent for administrative overhead was reduced. Had the SBC not undertaken the Covenant For A New Century, inflation would have cut more deeply into entity ministry budgets and resulted in a reduced level of funding today.

Two years ago the Executive Committee decided to eliminate the capital needs budget. This was a devastating blow to the six seminaries, but a positive help for the other entities. All of the other entities began to receive a percentage of money that had been set aside for specific projects approved for capital funding. The Executive Committee, having just remodeled its only building, and the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, having only its Nashville office and its newly purchased Washington office, had little need for money to do capital projects, but they now began receiving, in every year CP exceeds its operating budget, a portion of the money that

in the past went only to capital needs. The mission boards had annual offerings that could still provide funds necessary for capital projects, and now in addition they received a much higher percentage of what had been capital funds than any one of the seminaries could ever receive because of the SBC funding formula. To illustrate, 72.79 percent of the money that was designated for capital needs would now go to the International Mission Board and the North American Mission Board every year without exception. The six seminaries, because they require a large number of buildings to operate (126 buildings at New Orleans alone), because they are CP supported not CP funded, because they had nothing like the annual mission offerings to multiply their budgets, and because they individually receive such a small percentage of the SBC budget allocation (3.85% for New Orleans), suffered a disproportionate loss as a result of the capital funds decision. The new system made it virtually impossible for the seminaries to receive ever again the money they received in the past for capital projects.

This capital funds decision removed the possibility for a crucial supplement to CP funds for seminaries counting on supplemental funding in order to fulfill the expectations of Southern Baptists. Remember the earlier example. In the case of New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, the annual Cooperative Program allocation is not enough to cover the payroll cost of the seminary. What made the loss even more difficult is that these capital funds were used for those projects most difficult to raise money to do. Thus the pressure increased to push student fees, already at record highs, ever higher, and the pressure increased to keep the salaries of seminary professors low. So low, in fact, they are below national averages for both seminary professors and SBC church pastors.

Why would the loss of capital funding affect faculty salaries? There is more control over how much to pay someone than there is over whether or not a sewer system will collapse under a dormitory. Given the scale of facilities necessary to operate seminaries as large as the six SBC seminaries, significant costs for maintenance and repairs, both planned and unplanned, are inevitable. The seminaries have to control the costs they can control, in order to be prepared for the costs they cannot control. If one loses a traditional source of income for those costs one cannot control or avoid, such as repairs to the campus infrastructure, the costs that can be controlled must be tightly contained. This is one reason why the six SBC seminaries are far below the national average in costs per full time student. To give an example: the national average of cost per full time students for accredited seminaries in North America is \$30,000 per student in institutional costs. For New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary the cost is only \$7,000 per student. **We are spending \$23,000 less than the national average of cost per student.** The SBC seminaries are being run with dramatic efficiency in comparison with other seminaries because they have to be. When the capital needs money was taken away, there were virtually no costs left to cut in response to the loss of revenue. It was a devastating blow to most if not all of the seminaries.

#### The Critical Issue

Recently a member of the Executive Committee inadvertently became aware of how low faculty salaries were when a friend of his had to take a cut in pay to join the faculty of one of our seminaries. It appears that his awakened interest in what Southern Baptists are paying their professors brought us to this point with the appointment of a funding study committee by the SBC Executive Committee to consider alternatives for increased funding for the schools. Actually something more is involved. Here at the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century circumstances for the

six seminaries have so changed that the remaining strategies in place to supplement their Cooperative Program income, student fees and limited fund-raising, no longer provide adequate funding for the seminaries to fulfill their assigned purposes. The inadequacy of the existing strategy for supplementing CP income for the six seminaries has become more noticeable and more serious with each passing year. We are not far away from putting Southern Baptist theological education financially out of reach for many Southern Baptists. **Unless there are some changes, the moderate-dominated seminaries of the seventies and eighties will prove to have been far more affordable than the conservative-dominated seminaries of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.** In addition the six seminaries are gradually being forced to turn away from the SBC and its churches in their search for additional funding.

The most important issue is not faculty salaries or capital needs. They are symptoms of a larger problem. The real dilemma facing Southern Baptists is whether or not Southern Baptists will maintain the tradition of a theological education affordable to all God-called Southern Baptist ministers, even those who spend a lifetime serving small churches or working on a mission field. The pressure to bring SBC faculty salaries up to national norms and the pressure to find money for capital needs are the precipitating factors forcing the SBC seminaries to seek more funding. If their best alternative is to continue to push student fees higher and higher, theological education will become less accessible to the grass roots of Southern Baptists. The urgency of the funding study of the Executive Committee is in whether or not there is an alternative to relieve to at least some extent the upward pressure on student fees. I paid \$125 a **semester** for my seminary education. Today's students are paying \$125 **an hour**, plus other fees. What will tomorrow's students have to pay if nothing changes?

### Possible Options

What are the options for increasing the funding for these six Cooperative Program Supported entities? Here are at least a few possibilities. One would be to change the funding formula and give more of the Cooperative Program budget to the six seminaries. This would be the fastest way to provide additional funds for the schools. The major problem with this move is that it would mean taking funds away from other entities. It is also doubtful that a big enough change could be made to produce a permanent difference. A second possibility would be to change the business and financial plan to allow a wider variety of fund-raising strategies for the six seminaries. The major problem with this approach is that it could adversely affect the whole Cooperative Program. A third alternative is to give the seminaries more input into the Trustee selection process, allowing them to recruit at least some Trustees with major giving potential. In most institutions of higher education it is not unusual for a school's major donors to come from the Board of Trustees. The SBC Trustee selection process makes that highly unlikely for the six seminaries. Such a move would be a major change in Southern Baptist practice, however, and could have significant implications beyond finances. It would also take years for the seminaries to benefit from this approach.

Reinstating the capital needs budget for the seminaries only is a fourth possibility. This would provide immediate assistance to one of the greatest problems facing the six schools. If a capital needs budget was funded from Cooperative Program overages, it would not affect the operating budgets of the other entities. The problems are that there would have to be significant surpluses in annual giving to the Cooperative Program to make a permanent difference, and that it would limit the ability of the other entities to benefit from CP surpluses each year. A fifth possibility is to institute a convention-wide offering each year for the six seminaries. This is the

strategy the SBC has followed for the other Cooperative Program Supported entities, the two mission boards. Over time the national offerings for IMB and NAMB have become budget multipliers, significantly increasing financial support for mission ministries. They have also added to the denominational glue holding Southern Baptists together and served as an educational tool reminding Southern Baptists of how and why we are doing missions in our nation and across the world. The offerings have also strengthened the economic ties binding the mission boards to SBC churches. Today it is difficult to imagine the mission boards functioning without their annual offerings. The potential for the same effect is there with an annual offering for the six seminaries. The problems are how to organize and promote it, how to pay for the cost of it, and where to place it on the calendar.

None of these options are without potential problems. Some would have very significant implications for Southern Baptists years from now. In spite of the risks, however, the situation of the seminaries today argues that some course of action must be taken.

#### My Recommendation

If the decision were mine to make, I would recommend a combination of the above possibilities. I would suggest starting a W. A. Criswell offering for the six seminaries that will parallel what we have done for the mission boards, the other two Cooperative Program Supported entities. I would further suggest reinstating the capital needs budget for the seminaries only for at least five years to give them an opportunity to dig out of the deferred maintenance hole most, if not all of them are facing. The capital needs money could be limited to repairs, renovation, and infrastructure projects, not new buildings. These are the hardest projects to raise money to do, but they must be done if the schools are to accomplish their mission. This combination of strategies would address both the short and long term challenges

being faced by the seminaries. Most importantly this strategy would have little effect on the operating budgets of the other entities. The only other step I would personally consider is a very small change of the SBC Cooperative Program budget formula from 21.4% to 22%. This change of an additional six tenths of one percent is still less than the highest percentages given to the seminaries by moderates, but it is closer to those highs than conservatives have yet come (see Appendix B). It would also provide at least a little immediate help for the six schools.

Such moves are not the only possibility. There must be others. The key point is that something must be done if the SBC seminaries are going to be both healthy and affordable in the twenty-first century. The physical condition of the campuses and the low salaries of faculty and staff are two issues that cannot be avoided if the seminaries are to fulfill the ministries assigned to them by the SBC. The needs of the schools are steadily outpacing the funding from the denomination. Unless some changes are made, the gap between the two is going to become greater and greater. If student fees and gifts from donors continue to be the primary tools for closing that gap, something vital will be lost. Southern Baptists have never had seminaries the rank and file of their people could not afford. But that day will come. Southern Baptists have never had seminaries that were not financially dependent upon the denomination for their survival, but that day too will come.

### Conclusion

This last dimension of the situation is one I feel is particularly significant. The dilemma of operating costs growing faster than denominational support is not uncommon for schools started by denominations. It parallels another trend: the declining influence of denominations on schools they once controlled. A study of schools that left the influence of their parent denomination will reveal the departure was preceded by a declining percentage of

denominational funds in the operating budgets of the schools. That has certainly been the case of several Baptist colleges in the twentieth century. Southern Baptists have only six seminaries. It is a reasonable number of schools to support. Their diversity of strengths, locations, and strategies wrapped around a unity of purpose and doctrine serves Southern Baptists well. In fact there has never been a time when both the unity and the diversity among the seminaries are stronger than they are now. There has never been a time when the seminary leaders so perfectly blend the roles of theologian, pastor, missionary, and evangelist. If ever Southern Baptists would be open to a new initiative in funding the six seminaries, it is now.

The theological revolution within the six seminaries succeeded beyond the wildest expectations of many. If a funding revolution of sorts could be added to restore and even increase the level of denominational funding in the now transformed schools, allowing today's students to have the same access to affordable theological education that students had when the schools were controlled by moderates, it will create ties that bind even more tightly the future of the seminaries with the future of the denomination. More importantly, no process is more likely to give tomorrow's leaders a strong sense of denominational identity than high quality, low cost theological education at a denominational school. Most importantly, students trained on these campuses as they are today, with the new generation of professors now assembled, with the new focus on a church-based curriculum now in place, and with the new atmosphere of missionary zeal now permeating each campus, could become the greatest generation of Southern Baptists leaders ever going forth to serve! Six seminaries that are doctrinally sound, evangelistically zealous, and widely affordable could be the most influential legacy of the Conservative Resurgence. It would insure the SBC a steady supply of world-changing leaders for churches, mission fields, and denominational agencies. It is a future worth the risk of tough decisions.

In a book entitled *Orthodoxy*, G. K. Chesterton wrote:

[Maintaining the status quo] is based upon the idea if you leave things alone you leave them as they are. But you do not. If you leave a thing alone you leave it to a torrent of changes. If you leave a white post alone it will soon be a black post. If you particularly want it to be white you must be always painting it again. . . . Briefly, if you want the old white post you must have a new white post.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century Southern Baptists cannot afford to leave the process of funding theological education alone. Things have changed. The landscape in which the seminaries now function is significantly different than that of earlier days. The funding process must be tweaked to maintain both the affordability and quality Southern Baptists have come to expect. It's time to take up the brush and repaint the post of funding seminary training.

**Appendix A**  
**SBC Cooperative Program Entities\***

	<b>CP Income</b>	<b>Total Budget</b>	<b>(CP%)**</b>	<b>% of SBC Total Budget</b>
<b>Cooperative Program Funded Entities (Fully Funded)</b>				
Exec. Com.	5,298,180	6,544,490	(81.0%)	3.32%
ERLC	2,377,798	3,212,798	(74.0%)	1.49%
<b>Cooperative Program Supported Entities (Partially Funded)</b>				
IMB	79,791,872	241,600,000	(33.0%)	50.00%
NAMB	36,369,135	129,500,000	(28.1%)	22.79%
Golden Gate	3,290,000	7,674,000	(42.9%)	1.98%
Midwestern	2,906,371	4,585,185	(63.4%)	1.82%
NOBTS	6,147,039	14,447,106	(42.5%)	3.85%
Southeastern	5,812,524	13,023,652	(44.6%)	3.69%
Southern	6,162,187	19,235,736	(32.0%)	3.84%
Southwestern	9,841,053	27,511,955	(35.8%)	6.21%
<b>Cooperative Program Sustaining Entities (Indirectly Funded)</b>				
Annuity Board	1,272,291	1,411,296,084	(0.1%)	0.76%
Lifeway	-	369,791,000	(0.0%)	0.00%
*Financial data is from the 1999-2000 Book of Reports				
** Percentage of entity's total budget from entity CP allocation				

**Appendix B**  
**Cooperative Program Distribution History**

	<b>CP</b>	<b>Seminaries* CP%</b>	<b>IMB CP%</b>	<b>NAMB CP%</b>	<b>ERLC CP%</b>	<b>Exec. Com. CP%</b>	<b>Other** CP%</b>
1975	36,000,000	20.17	50.00	18.75	0.68	1.00	9.41
1976	41,000,000	20.98	49.95	18.73	0.68	1.03	8.62
1977	49,000,000	17.74	48.22	18.78	0.66	1.00	13.61
1978	54,000,000	22.48	48.15	18.99	0.66	0.99	8.74
1979	62,000,000	21.63	48.00	20.16	0.68	0.97	8.56
1980	68,500,000	21.73	48.69	19.53	0.66	1.03	8.37
1981	74,500,000	22.21	48.40	19.46	0.61	1.28	8.04
1982	83,400,000	21.73	49.00	19.50	0.59	1.41	7.78
1983	96,635,000	21.24	49.51	19.66	0.58	1.47	7.54
1984	114,500,000	20.62	50.00	19.77	0.62	1.43	7.57
1985	118,000,000	20.56	50.00	19.72	0.62	1.42	7.68
1986	120,600,000	20.49	50.00	19.64	0.62	1.42	7.83
1987	126,630,000	20.49	50.17	19.71	0.61	1.40	7.61
1988	132,000,000	20.32	50.00	19.54	0.60	2.16	7.38
1989	137,610,000	20.32	50.00	19.54	0.63	2.26	7.25
1990	134,787,543	20.46	50.00	19.54	0.67	2.34	6.98
1991	137,332,523	20.46	50.00	19.55	0.92	2.09	6.98
1992	140,710,282	20.27	50.00	19.55	0.98	2.28	6.92
1993	140,200,395	20.27	50.00	19.55	0.98	2.28	6.91
1994	138,234,735	20.27	50.00	19.55	0.99	2.27	6.91
1995	136,539,730	20.27	50.00	19.56	0.99	2.27	6.91
1996	141,629,127	20.40	50.00	19.56	0.99	2.27	6.79
1997	145,053,499	20.40	50.00	20.36	0.99	3.07	5.18
1998	148,185,077	21.40	50.00	22.79	1.49	3.32	1.00
1999	155,005,723	21.40	50.00	22.79	1.49	3.32	1.00
2000	159,583,743	21.40	50.00	22.79	1.49	3.32	1.00
2001	167,996,385	21.40	50.00	22.79	1.49	3.32	1.00
2002	178,298,879	21.40	50.00	22.79	1.49	3.32	1.00
2003	176,962,402	21.40	50.00	22.79	1.49	3.32	1.00

\*Divided among the six seminaries according to Executive Committee Funding Formula  
\*\*Includes CP allocations for discontinued entities, the Annuity Board, and the Southern Baptist Historical Library and Archives

**Appendix C**  
**Percentage Distribution of SBC Giving 1975-2001,**  
**Including Cooperative Program and Designated Gifts**

	<b>Total SBC</b>	<b>GGBTS</b>	<b>MWBTS</b>	<b>NOBTS</b>	<b>SBTS</b>	<b>SEBTS</b>	<b>SWBTS</b>	<b>IMB</b>	<b>NAMB</b>	<b>EC</b>	<b>ERLC</b>	<b>OTHER</b>
1975	76,754,221	1.13%	1.27%	2.02%	2.80%	1.74%	3.31%	60.40%	21.79%	0.52%	0.36%	4.65%
1976	86,286,334	1.22%	1.02%	2.03%	2.93%	1.64%	3.48%	60.06%	21.96%	0.55%	0.36%	8.77%
1977	94,386,083	1.27%	1.47%	1.99%	2.98%	1.87%	3.60%	58.67%	22.34%	0.53%	0.35%	8.99%
1978	105,330,740	1.17%	1.13%	1.87%	2.76%	1.79%	3.95%	58.53%	22.99%	0.53%	0.35%	9.07%
1979	119,076,383	2.41%	1.31%	1.77%	2.53%	1.76%	3.18%	58.56%	23.05%	0.57%	0.35%	8.35%
1980	135,202,196	1.93%	0.99%	1.74%	2.95%	2.17%	3.11%	58.89%	22.95%	0.65%	0.33%	8.10%
1981	145,507,501	1.76%	1.06%	1.92%	2.75%	2.23%	3.58%	56.90%	23.55%	0.67%	0.33%	9.34%
1982	163,478,043	1.00%	1.37%	2.83%	2.70%	1.79%	3.61%	58.80%	22.70%	0.77%	0.30%	8.49%
1983	179,335,343	1.22%	1.19%	2.54%	2.59%	2.61%	3.41%	57.55%	23.40%	0.83%	0.33%	7.61%
1984	190,614,289	1.15%	1.00%	1.98%	2.51%	1.85%	3.28%	58.71%	24.02%	0.82%	0.35%	7.57%
1985	207,728,675	1.14%	0.97%	1.94%	2.48%	1.84%	3.25%	58.90%	23.96%	0.88%	0.40%	7.46%
1986	217,854,544	1.10%	1.30%	1.95%	3.04%	1.77%	3.57%	58.08%	23.44%	0.99%	0.35%	7.74%
1987	228,680,596	1.11%	0.96%	1.88%	2.47%	1.76%	3.32%	57.69%	24.02%	1.50%	0.56%	8.30%
1988	234,795,519	1.20%	0.99%	1.89%	2.55%	1.82%	3.36%	57.86%	23.84%	1.54%	0.45%	7.85%
1989	247,297,341	1.05%	0.98%	1.90%	2.46%	1.66%	3.27%	59.02%	24.07%	1.26%	0.35%	7.16%
1990	255,500,122	1.13%	0.97%	1.90%	2.36%	1.63%	3.19%	58.21%	24.46%	1.59%	0.47%	7.40%
1991	254,203,686	1.19%	1.03%	1.97%	2.45%	1.69%	3.29%	58.24%	24.63%	1.14%	0.50%	7.00%
1992	257,208,829	1.10%	0.94%	1.85%	2.31%	1.59%	3.12%	58.50%	25.13%	1.24%	0.51%	6.91%
1993	253,840,082	1.10%	0.94%	1.85%	2.31%	1.59%	3.12%	58.80%	24.83%	1.23%	0.53%	6.91%
1994	261,472,769	1.19%	1.03%	1.97%	2.44%	1.56%	3.27%	58.27%	24.71%	1.22%	0.53%	6.94%
1995	267,908,541	1.21%	1.06%	1.97%	2.44%	1.45%	3.26%	58.54%	24.67%	1.18%	0.52%	6.80%
1996	275,165,731	1.14%	1.19%	2.06%	2.51%	1.50%	3.30%	58.21%	24.69%	1.19%	0.52%	6.83%
1997	285,828,312	1.22%	1.20%	2.20%	2.53%	1.63%	3.32%	57.72%	25.36%	1.64%	0.52%	4.90%
1998	296,791,172	1.24%	1.19%	2.34%	2.53%	1.85%	3.49%	57.80%	26.54%	1.72%	0.77%	0.97%
1999	307,188,500	1.19%	1.08%	2.27%	2.35%	1.97%	3.46%	58.12%	26.45%	1.78%	0.80%	0.98%
2000	329,263,494	1.07%	0.99%	2.09%	2.08%	2.08%	3.36%	58.54%	26.72%	1.80%	0.81%	0.86%
2001	328,792,803	1.08%	0.95%	2.09%	2.05%	2.08%	3.27%	58.50%	26.86%	1.79%	0.80%	1.00%